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Introduction
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), previously named the Food Stamp Program, is one of the largest safety net programs in the United States. Over 43 million individuals, approximately 13 percent of the U.S. population, received benefits from the program in 2016, at a cost of roughly 70 billion dollars (United States Department of Agriculture 2017). 1 However, the program has an uncertain future. For example, the 2017 executive budget proposed cutting Federal spending on the program by 190 billion dollars over 10 years, through a mix of stricter eligibility requirements and shifting the costs of the program to state level expenditures (Office of Management and Budget 2017). If eligibility for Food Stamps is to be restricted with the stated policy goal of lowering Federal spending, then the impact of program eligibility on participants' health care utilization is vital to cost-benefit analysis. For example, Food Stamp eligibility may have effects on participants that lower their health care utilization.
Therefore, tightening eligibility requirements could cause costs to rise in other safety net programs, such as Medicaid, undermining the cost savings from limiting the Food Stamps program. In this study, we ask if such a relationship exists. Specifically, does Food Stamp eligibility have an impact on adult health care utilization.
The quasi-experimental literature exploring the health impacts of Food Stamps receipt has not to-date produced an estimate of Food Stamp eligibility's impact on adult health care use at the time of benefit receipt. 2 Adults are the largest group of Food Stamp benefit recipients, accounting for 51 percent of all recipients (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2015) . As such, any 1 We use the name Food Stamps throughout, as this was the name of the program at the time period of our study. 2 There are several papers that touch on this topic through the Food Stamp Program's impact on children: East (2017a) found that childhood receipt of Food Stamps improves health outcomes contemporaneously and in the short to medium run. Hoynes, Schazenbach and Almond (2016) , found that childhood receipt of Food Stamps during the initial rollout of the program improved health outcomes in adulthood such as height and the prevalence of metabolic illnesses. Additionally, Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk (2008) estimate the impact of Food Stamps on medical expenditures, and find increased expenditure levels using a structural model with instrumental variables. effects of Food Stamps on adult health care utilization could have a large impact in terms of dollars spent on health care in the immediate to short-run, because adults have far greater health care expenditures per capita than children do, once children are out of early childhood. To illustrate, in 2013, the United States spent 1.6 thousand dollars per capita on health care for female children aged 5 to 9, as opposed to 7.2 thousand dollars per capita on health care for female adults aged 45 to 49 (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2017). 3 In this study, we estimate the contemporaneous impact of Food Stamp eligibility on adult health care utilization by taking advantage of changing eligibility rules due to the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which created plausibly exogenous variation in Food Stamp eligibility for immigrant populations. PRWORA made most documented non-citizen immigrants ineligible for Food Stamps, an action that was gradually reversed by state and federal laws in the period between 1998 and 2003. 4 Previous work has shown that these policy changes had a large effect on Food Stamp participation and the benefit amount received (e.g. Borjas 2004 , East 2017b ). Using an empirical strategy similar to East (2017a; 2017b), we take advantage of differing eligibility criteria across states and over time, and verify using the Current Population Survey there were large effects on Food Stamp receipt among immigrant adults. We then extend the analysis using data from the National Health Interview Survey to estimate the impact of a single year of eligibility on adults' health care utilization and related outcomes. 5 We find that a year of eligibility decreases the likelihood of multiple physician office visits within the year, but there is little evidence of an effect on the likelihood of any physician office visits. We find no effect on emergency room utilization or hospitalizations. We also find suggestive evidence that Food Stamps reduce the likelihood of not utilizing specialty medical care due to cost for single women. We examine whether these results could be driven by changes in health outcomes, and we find no consistent evidence that Food Stamps has an impact on selfreported health. We also find no evidence that the population driving our results is those with common chronic conditions such as heart disease, hypertension or diabetes. Our results are therefore suggestive of Food Stamps reducing the need for repeated primary care among the relatively healthy. This might operate through improved nutrition and ability to weather common illnesses, such as the flu, without seeking medical attention. The estimated effects imply that government spending on health care may have been significantly impacted by PRWORA. At the time Food Stamp eligibility was restored to most immigrants, 43% of adult immigrants who received Food Stamp benefits were also covered by the Medicaid program, and a reduction in physician visits could thus decrease Medicaid expenditures for this population. 6
II. Food Stamp Eligibility and Health Care Utilization
Eligibility for Food Stamps may influence adult health care utilization in several ways.
The simplest is via income: though Food Stamps are an in-kind transfer, individuals who receive the benefit could substitute dollars that would have been spent on food to other purposes.
Medical care is a normal good, and as such, a positive income shock would be expected to increase utilization of care. 7 The support for additional consumption of medical care via an 6 Author's calculations using the 2004-2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey. We note that the effects on affordability of specialty care for women suggest that women may have increased the use of specialty care. However, we do not observe utilization of specialty care, so are unable to test this directly. Therefore, for women in particular, the effect on Medicaid expenditures may be ambiguous. 7 See Newhouse (1992) for a review of estimates of income elasticities of demand for medical care, or Baltagi et al. 2017 for a more recent estimate. income effect as a mechanism is somewhat mixed, however; some studies find Food Stamps are treated similar to a pure cash transfer (Moffitt 1989; Currie 2003; Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009; Bruich 2014; Hoynes, McGranahan and Schazenbach 2015) . On the other hand, Beatty and Tuttle (2014) find that Food Stamps may distort individuals to consume more food than they would have if given an equivalent cash transfer, which would dampen any income effects on health care utilization.
Food Stamps could also have an impact on adult health care utilization through changes in individual health. However, the impact of Food Stamps on health would need to be relatively immediate in order for this to have a contemporaneous impact on health care utilization. For example, changes in nutrition may affect body weight, and many studies find that Food Stamp eligibility increases the likelihood of obesity. 8 However, much of this evidence estimates the effect of past receipt on current obesity, measuring the impact of prolonged Food Stamp receipt, rather than the contemporaneous effect of the program. Moreover, the study utilizing methods closest to our own finds no immediate impact of immigrants' Food Stamps eligibility on their body mass index (BMI) (Kaushal, 2007) . 9 This is not surprising for the reason previously described: if Food Stamps change BMI though a change in nutrition, such a change would take time before it shows up via health outcomes such as BMI, and perhaps even longer before it subsequently affects health care utilization.
There are still, however, possible pathways for Food Stamps to affect health care utilization via health of the recipient with immediacy. For example, it is possible that mental health is more quickly changed than physical health in response to a change in household 8 There are several studies that find Food Stamps increase the likelihood of obesity with varying magnitudes of effect (Townsend et al. 2001; Gibson 2003; Gibson 2004; Chen, Yen and Eastwood 2005; Meyerhofer and Pylypchuck 2008; Baum 2011) . 9 We also investigate whether the same is true in our sample period described below, which is slightly different than that in Kaushal (2007) and thus uses slightly different policy variation. resources , and changes in mental health may have immediate health care needs such as suicide prevention counseling. It is also possible that sudden income increases could induce risky behaviors that immediately affect individual health, such as illicit drug use, which can immediately increase health care utilization via overdose. Pollack and Reuter (2006) find that substance use is higher among benefit recipients than in the general population, and several findings suggest mortality may increase shortly after the receipt of income, in part due to increases in drug use (e.g Dobkin and Puller, 2007; Evans and Moore, 2012) . To explore these possibilities, we will examine physical and mental health metrics.
The final possibility is that Food Stamps has a direct impact on health care needs because of increased food consumption, and a reduction in the likelihood of a household being food insecure. Food Stamps have been shown to both increase consumption of food, and decrease food insecurity (see for example : Borjas 2004; Wilde and Nord 2005; Ratcliffe, McKernan and Zhang 2011 ; and reviews by by Schanzenbach 2015 and Gregory, Rabbitt and Ribar 2015) . Food insecurity has been identified in the medical and public health literatures as a predictor of increased health care utilization. 10 Most directly related to our hypothesis is a study by Seligman et al. (2014) of hospital admissions in California. They showed that admissions for hypoglycemia increased noticeably for likely low-income individuals at the end of the month, when Food Stamp benefits (which are allocated monthly, often at the beginning of the month) are more likely to have run out. The same pattern did not occur for likely high-income individuals.
III. PRWORA and Food Stamp Eligibility
The enactment of PRWORA in 1996 changed the federal Food Stamp eligibility criteria to exclude most documented non-citizen immigrants. States, however, were given the option to fund benefits for the newly federally-ineligible populations. Nine states took this option prior to 2002, filling the benefit gap back in for the federally-ineligible. These "Fill-In" states were California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. We will refer to the other 41 states and the District of Columbia as "No-Fill-In" states. 11 Later, the 2002 Farm Bill restored federal eligibility to three groups of non-citizen immigrants: the disabled, children, and those who had lived in the United States for at least five years. 12 We show a timelines of the relevant changes to immigrant eligibility in Figure 1 .
Loss of eligibility for non-citizen adults in a household did not necessarily cause households to lose all Food Stamp benefits. U.S. born children of non-citizen parents have U.S. citizenship, and thus remain eligible for the program even when their foreign-born parents lose eligibility. Moreover, all foreign-born children were made eligible as part of the Agriculture, Research Extension and Education Reform Act in 1998. As resources within a household can be redistributed amongst its members, loss of individual eligibility is not necessarily equivalent to a loss of access to all Food Stamp benefits. However, when the number of eligible members in the household falls, the benefit amount that can be shared within the household also falls. For example, for a household of three, with one citizen child and two ineligible immigrant parents, benefits could have fallen by almost 66% ($2400 annually in 1998). This decrease in the benefit amount for households with children was large, so in practice these households may have 11 Even though some of the "No-Fill-In" states did restore benefits to some extent, they often did so with significant additional strings attached. For example, some states required that immigrants apply for citizenship after receiving Food Stamp benefits, and we do not consider these states to be Fill-in states. We define the presence of a fill-in program based on information from the USDA SNAP Policy Database, the California Department of Social Services, and Bitler and Hoynes (2013) . 12 This discussion drawn primarily from Zimmermann and Tumlin (1999), Capps (2004) , and Bitler and Hoynes (2013) . behaved as if they had lost eligibility entirely, and stopped participating all together if the small benefit amounts no longer outweighed the costs of participating (Daponte, Sanders and Taylor, 1999) . Existing evidence indicates this may have been the case (Van Hook and Balistreri, 2006) , so, to simplify the analysis to follow, we focus on the eligibility of adults in the household and do not differentiate between households with and without children.
There were several groups of non-citizen immigrants who were unaffected by the changes in eligibility criteria contained in PRWORA. Immigrants who had worked in the U.S.
for 40 quarters and met minimum earnings requirements in each quarter, those who had served in the military, or those who were refugees, asylees, or naturalized citizens remained eligible. 13
IV. Empirical Strategy
To identify the effect of Food Stamp eligibility on Food Stamp benefit receipt, health care utilization and related outcomes, we estimate the following equation:
where The identifying assumption in this model is that there are no other changes occurring across states and over time that are correlated with the Food Stamp eligibility criteria changes and that affect our outcomes of interest as well. East (2017a) finds no evidence that of state fixed demographic or political characteristics predicting a fill-in program; however, these characteristics are absorbed by the state fixed effects. More importantly, East (2017a) also documents the presence of a fill-in program is not correlated with changes in state's economic conditions or safety net generosity over time.
V. Data
We draw most of our analysis data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to provide information regarding health care and related outcomes. We use survey years 1998-2007, which span the period of restoration of Food Stamp eligibility for most immigrants. 15 The survey covers roughly 35,000 households annually and is nationally representative.
14 The CPS data is only available annually so we omit the calendar quarter controls when using those data. 15 The survey format of the NHIS changes prior to 1998, so we restrict the sample to begin in 1998.
Demographics and some health information are collected for every individual in the household;
these data are contained in the "Person File". The NHIS also chooses an adult at random from each household and asks additional detailed questions about their health and health care; these data are contained in the "Sample Adult File". We use outcomes from both files; outcomes obtained from the Sample Adult File have smaller sample sizes.
Importantly, the NHIS collects information on the country of birth and year of entry for every foreign-born, which we use to construct our measure of "treated immigrants" and potential controls groups. We define "treated immigrants" as those who were born outside the U.S. and U.S. territories, and who report coming to the U.S. "to stay" less than 15 years, but more than 5 years before the survey. These restrictions on year of entry are intended to capture the group of immigrants likely to be affected by the changes in Food Stamp eligibility, as they have lived in the U.S. long enough to qualify for the Farm Bill restoration, but not long enough to qualify via the 40 quarters of work exemption or by gaining citizenship. 16 There are, however, a number of measurement issues with reported year of entry to the U.S.; therefore, this year of entry restriction should be interpreted as only a rough proxy for those likely to have experienced Food Stamp eligibility changes. 17 Our primary sample is adult heads of household and their spouses, for whom the head of household (male if present, otherwise female) has a high school education or less. This low-educated group is more likely to be affected by Food Stamp policy changes because, prior to welfare reform, they participated in the program at very high rates (East 2017b) .
We follow the Food Stamp policy definition of "adults" and keep individuals ages 18-59 in our sample. If the head of household is married, we restrict both spouses to be treated immigrants.
Later, we also use U.S.-born adults as a control group in alternative analyses.
To measure health care utilization, we include a measure of whether each adult, within the past year, had any physician office visits, any ER visits, or any overnight hospitalizations.
The number of physician office visits is coded as a categorical variable in the NHIS, so, to capture intensive margin changes in utilization, we also create a binary variable indicating whether the individual had 2 or more physician office visits in the past year. We also include measures of whether medical care and four types of specialty health care--mental care, dental care, glasses, or prescription medicines--were needed but not received due to cost. To avoid issues of multiple hypothesis testing, we create a summary index that captures the 4 types of specialty care affordability (Anderson, 2008) . The index is constructed as a weighted sum of zscores of the component outcome variables. To create the z-scores of each outcome variable, we calculate the mean and standard deviation for each outcome among treated immigrants living in No-Fill-In states before 2002 (who were not eligible for Food Stamps). The weights are constructed using the inverse of the group of outcomes' variance-covariance matrix. This method makes efficient use of the information within the measures, as outcomes that are highly correlated are given a lower weight. We then subtract each outcome's mean and divide by its standard deviation.
To capture health outcomes, we use self-reported measures of overall health, as well as mental health, and obesity/overweight status. The measure of overall health is on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 denoting "excellent" health and 5 denoting "poor" health. While this is a subjective measure, self-reported health is a good predictor of mortality (Idler and Benyamini, 1997; DeSalvo et al., 2006) . We also create a binary variable to ease interpretation, which takes on a value of one if the individual reports to be in "very good" or "excellent" health. There are six mental health questions, so we create a summary index of the corresponding six variables, similar to the one described above for affordability. These six questions ask how often, in the past 30 days, the individual has felt "sad", "nervous", "restless or fidgety", "hopeless", "that everything was an effort", or "worthless". 
VI. Results

VI.A. Program Participation
Before examining the effect of eligibility on health care utilization, we demonstrate that eligibility indeed influenced program participation for treated immigrants. 
VI.B. Utilization
We next examine how access to Food Stamps affects health care utilization in Table 3 . given Medicaid, as found by Finkelstein et al. (2013). 18 Column 3 shows that for all adults, these intensive effects are concentrated among the second or third annual visit, whereas for single women the intensive effects reach into larger number of annual visits. We find no evidence of changes in the likelihood of having any overnight hospitalizations or ER visits, although these point estimates are also mostly negative (columns 5-7). 19 If the reduction in the number of doctor visits is due to better case management, we might expect to see changes in hospital or ER utilization, similar to Seligman et al. (2014) , however, ER and hospital visits are quite rare in the data relative to doctor visits, which may explain the imprecision of our results on these outcomes. 20
The estimates on two or more physician visits imply intent-to-treat effects of 44% and 45%, respectively, which are quite large. However, the confidence intervals are also very wide, which is not dissimilar to the large confidence intervals in other studies utilizing similar methods such as Borjas (2004) and Kaushal (2007) . Moreover, we are cautious about interpreting the 18 Finkelstein et al. (2013) also found effects on utilization for Medicaid on the extensive margin. It is difficult to compare magnitudes as the utilization variables in Finkelstein et al. (2013) are continuous and ours are categorical. 19 It is important to note that "office visit" includes times seeing a doctor or health care professional at a doctor's office, clinic, or other place and does not include ER visits, overnight hospitalizations, dental visits or telephone calls. So these outcomes are mutually exclusive. 20 We have also examined whether the number of ER visits, conditional on any visits, is affected and find no evidence that it is. sample mean as the counterfactual incidence rate of two or more physician visits, because those that actually participate in Food Stamps are likely to be much more disadvantaged than the full sample. For example, 3.6% of treated immigrants who are poor report being diagnosed with diabetes, relative to 2.3% for the non-poor. Similarly, the rates of heart disease, hypertension, and overweight/obesity, as well as the incidence of heart attacks, are all much higher among the poor relative to non-poor sample. 21
VI.C. Affordability
To understand the reason for the change in the intensity of doctor visits, we examine several possible mechanisms. First, we test whether Food Stamps affected the affordability of general medical care or four types of specialty care (prescription medication, mental health care, dental care, eyeglasses). If Food Stamps increase family resources, allowing individuals to afford better care or specialty care-e.g. medication to better manage chronic conditions-this may reduce the need for doctor office visits. As shown in Table 4 , there is no evidence that Food
Stamps affect the likelihood of not receiving needed medical care due to cost (column 1).
However, the summary index of affordability of specialty care indicates that, for single women, eligibility for Food Stamps reduces the likelihood they did not receive specialty care due to issues of cost (column 2). This is similar to the suggestive evidence for children found in Bronchetti, Christensen, and Hoynes (2017) , who document that higher-value SNAP benefits reduce unaffordability of children's health care. Looking across the columns, the effect on the summary index of affordability of specialty care appears to be driven primarily by a decline in the unaffordability of mental and dental care, although the estimates on all types of specialty care 21 Authors' calculations using the NHIS.
are negative. 22 This suggests one potential pathway for reduced doctor visits is through improved affordability of needed specialty care. It is important to note, however, that the affordability of mental care may be driven by changes in health, as well as changes in affordability, because the question refers to care that is "needed [but not received] because you couldn't afford it."
Therefore, we next examine how Food Stamps directly affect mental and physical health outcomes that may be influenced by short-run changes in access to Food Stamps. Changes in these outcomes could explain the changes in the number of doctor visits or the unaffordability of mental care. The first column examines the categorical measure of selfreported overall health, and the second column transforms this variable into a dummy variable to ease interpretation-this variable is equal to one if the individual reports being in "Excellent" or "Very Good" health. Across both outcomes, we find no effect of Food Stamp eligibility on selfassessed health. There is also no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of being overweight or obese in the short-run, confirming the findings of Kaushal (2007) . Finally, we find no evidence of effects on mental health, indicating the change in affordability of mental health care found in the previous section (reported in Table 4 ) for single women is not due to a change in whether mental care is perceived to be needed.
VI.D. Self-Reported Health
VI.E. Chronic Illness
22 Our measure of doctor visits does not include dental care. Therefore, we are unable to test if these individuals actually received more dental care because of Food Stamps.
We next explore the possibility that Food Stamps decreased health care utilization by allowing existing patients to improve their management of chronic illnesses. This could be due to increased resources in general, or improved nutrition allowing for better regulation of glycemic illnesses such as diabetes. To accomplish this, we once again estimate equation (1) using a binary variable for multiple office visits in the past year as an outcome, as this was where we estimated the strongest response to Food Stamp eligibility among utilization outcomes. We then include in equation (1) an additional interaction between the eligibility measure and a binary variable for if the individual reports having ever been diagnosed with a chronic illness.
Specifically, we look at diabetes, hypertension, any reported chronic illness (heart disease, obesity, diabetes, or hypertension), and self-reported "poor" or "fair" health, which can be viewed as a catch-all that is likely correlated with chronic illness. If the coefficient on these interactions shows a strong response, this would be evidence of Food Stamp eligibility having an additional effect on utilization for individuals with those specific chronic illnesses.
The results from this analysis are reported in Table 6 . None of the interaction coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. These estimates suggest that reductions in the utilization of health care due to Food Stamp eligibility were not due to better management of chronic conditions.
To summarize, we find evidence that Food Stamp eligibility reduces the likelihood of two or more doctor visits in the past year, as well as needing specialty care but not receiving it due to cost for single women. We find no evidence that these changes in health care utilization and health care affordability are driven by changes in physical or mental health, or due to individuals with chronic conditions in particular needing less care. The increase in resources from Food
Stamp access allow single women to afford needed specialty medical care they previously were unable to. While we are unable to determine the exact mechanisms behind the effect on doctor visits, our results do suggest a potential mechanism may be improved management of general health (as opposed to chronic conditions), due to increased resources, or improved nutrition.
VII. Robustness and Specification Checks
The identifying assumption in the regression model is that there are no other changes occurring across states and over time that are correlated with the Food Stamp policy changes that also affect adult health care. One way to test the validity of this assumption is to implement a triple difference model with low-educated U.S.-born adults as a control group. To do this we estimate a model similar to equation (1) above, but here we also include control/treatment status fixed effects (that indicate whether the individual is a "treated immigrant" or U.S.-born), as well as state by control/treatment status fixed effects, and year by control/treatment status fixed effects. We also interact the state by year controls, !" , with whether the individual is in the control/treatment group to allow for differential effects of economic conditions and state policy on immigrants and natives. Finally, we include the same measure of treated immigrants eligibility . . !" as in equation (1), as well as this measure interacted with whether the individual is in the treatment group: . . !" * ! .
If the identifying assumption is correct, we expect the coefficient on treated immigrants' eligibility to be close to zero, as this captures the effect of treated immigrants' eligibility on natives' outcomes. Additionally, the coefficient on the interaction term should be similar to our baseline estimates. In this, and all other robustness and specification checks, we focus on the outcome of two or more doctor visits, as this was the most precisely estimated and consistent result. This result is shown in column 2 of Table 7 and confirms both of these predictions. The triple difference model also provides a falsification test in the first row of column 2-there is no effect of immigrant-specific Food Stamp eligibility on natives' outcomes. Additionally, we can push this triple difference model even further by including state by year fixed effects, which flexibly absorbs any common shocks to health care that affect both natives and treated immigrants. In this model, we drop the un-interacted measure of treated immigrants' eligibility.
These results are shown in the third column of Table 7 and provide very similar estimates as the baseline model. 23
The main limitation of the triple difference model is that natives may not be an ideal control group for treated immigrants. So, an alternative test of the identifying assumption is to directly include controls for other state-by-year policies and characteristics. We do this in columns 2-4 of Table 8 . Accounting for other state safety net generosity (maximum TANF benefits, presence of a SCHIP program or a state EITC), and state attitudes towards immigrants do not substantively change the results. The inclusion of the state SNAP options (online application, Broad-based Categorical Eligibility, time requirements for re-eligibility certification, face-to-face interview and recertification requirements, fingerprint requirements, and vehicle exemptions) cause the coefficient for single women to no longer be statistically significantly different from zero. This is due to an increase in standard error as well as a slight decrease in the magnitude of the estimate. The results remain similar for all adults. A final concern with the identifying assumption is that Fill-In states may have had different trends in health care than No-Fill-In states, which may bias the results. To account for this, we include state linear time trends in column 5 and the results are very similar to the baseline.
We also conduct a number of specification checks on the main results, shown in columns 6-8 of Table 8 . First, we drop all observations from California, as California is by far the largest Fill-In state, and the results remain similar. Next, we include census region-by-year fixed effects to account for differences across regions and time in health care utilization. These fixed effects will account for, for example, a large flu epidemic in the south in one year. This addition causes the standard errors to increase and the coefficients to shrink slightly, so the point estimates are no longer statistically different from zero, however, qualitatively the results are very similar to the main estimates. Finally, we include calendar month-by-year fixed effects. The policy changes occur at the year and month level, so there is still identifying variation left after inclusion of these controls; however, this is a very demanding specification. Nevertheless, the results remain similar. 24 We next examine the effects on several different subgroups likely to be less affected by the policy changes than our primary group of interest. If the main results were driven by some unaccounted-for changes in health care occurring across states and over time, then the effect estimated with these "placebo" groups would be similar to our main results. First, we restrict the sample to immigrants who entered the U.S. more than 10 years, and more than 20 years before the survey. The longer immigrants have been in the U.S., the less likely will be affected by the Food Stamp eligibility changes, as they are more likely to either have become naturalized citizens, or to have earned 40 quarters of qualifying work in the U.S.. As expected, the effects are much smaller for these groups, shown in columns 2-3 of Table 9 . For all adults, the effect falls to zero, and for single women the effect is still statistically significant, but attenuated relative to the main results. However, these results should be interpreted with the caveat that there is 24 The results for single women's affordability of specialty medical care and results for food stamp receipt and benefit amount are also qualitatively similar across all these robustness and specification checks. Results available upon request. measurement error in foreign-born individuals' year of arrival to the U.S.. We also break down the samples into four disaggregate education groups: less than high school, high school, some college, and college or more. We expect there to be much smaller effects on the highly educated groups, as they participated in the Food Stamp program at much lower rates prior to welfare reform, and indeed this is what we find in columns 4-7.
As a final test of our identification strategy, we examine how Food Stamp eligibility is correlated with the observable characteristics of our sample that are not used in the construction of our eligibility measure. A consistent pattern of an observable characteristic predicted by eligibility could be seen as suggestive evidence that our results are driven by selective changes in the sample composition. Results from this analysis are shown in Table 10 . There are no consistent patterns.
IX. Conclusion
This study provides quasi-experimental evidence about the effects of the Food Stamp program on adults' contemporaneous health care utilization. We find a reduction in the number The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. Means weighted using the sample weights. The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the US, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01 The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the US, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01 The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the US, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01 The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the US, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01 The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the US, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01 The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. In the triple difference specifications, the sample also includes all U.S.born individuals aged 18-59 whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the US, and the number of elderly living in the household. Triple difference specifications in columns 2 and 3 also include state by immigrant status, and year by immigrant status fixed effects, as well as the state by year controls interacted with immigrant status. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.0 The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the US, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01 Baseline sample is all immigrants whose head of household has a high school education or less and who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year. The sample in columns 2-3 is the same as the baseline sample, except it conditions on different year of entry cutoffs as listed. The samples in columns 4-7 are the same as the baseline sample except they condition on different educational attainment cutoffs as listed. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01 The sample is all immigrants aged 18-59 who moved to the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights. * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
A. Data Appendix
We include controls for economic conditions and other safety net programs in our estimation models. Economic conditions are known to influence adult health and health behavior (see for example Ruhm 2000 , Ruhm 2005 , as do safety net programs (see for example . We merge on to the NHIS information about states' unemployment rates, whether the state had an EITC or SCHIP program, maximum welfare benefits, other state Food Stamp policies, and income eligibility cutoffs for Medicaid and SCHIP for children by state.
We obtain unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. EITC information comes from the NBER TAXSIM. Dates on maximum welfare benefits are from Robert Moffitt (available here: http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/moffitt/datasets.html) . Information on other Food Stamp program changes-the frequency with which applications must be re-certified, whether in-person applications or re-certifications are required, state spending on outreach, broad based categorical eligibility, vehicle asset rules, and whether benefits are issued on debit cards, are all obtained from the USDA's SNAP Policy Database. The SCHIP program start dates are obtained from Rosenbach et al. (2001) and the Medicaid/SCHIP generosity measures come from Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) , which are supplemented with information from the National Governor's Association.
Local attitudes regarding immigration may affect immigrants' program participation (Watson, 2014) , so we follow Bronchetti (2014) and include two measures of state attitudes: 1) the fraction of individuals reporting they would like immigration decreased from the American National Election Studies (ANES), and 2) the number of deportation court cases per foreign-born individual from Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Immigration Reports. The
